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Abstract
* 
Experience in northern and developed countries suggests that a well functioning 
rental sector (potentially including both social and private renting) is an important 
component of a complete and effective housing system, offering more solutions to 
meet a full spectrum of demands and needs. As such, it is appropriate to explore 
the  opportunities  for  the  Bank  to  support  the  rental  options  alongside  the 
traditional lending and program focus that has generally favored homeownership. 
This paper seeks to outline the existing tenure patterns across Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) countries, identify the prerequisite features of effective rental 
sectors—based on experience in developed OECD countries—, and outline the 
necessary steps to develop and expand the rental sector in LAC countries. This 
includes  consideration  of  both  the  private  (private  investors)  and  community 
rental sector (community based nonprofit and cooperative ownership).  
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 ﾠ1  Introduction 
The  Inter-American  Development  Bank  (IDB)  wishes  to  identify  and  help  implement 
opportunities  to  nurture  and  expand  formal  rental  tenure  across  the  Latin  American  and 
Caribbean  (LAC)  countries  in  an  effort  to  expand  shelter  opportunities  for  lower  income 
households, especially in urban markets. The rationale for the Bank’s involvement includes the 
following: 
•  To  advise  government  authorities  on  policy  implementations  and  supports  them 
throughout a lending program for the development of rental housing for lower-income 
households.  
•  To  enable  a  more  integrated  approach,  incorporating  elements  of  the  current  Bank’s 
strategy for the development of the housing sector (i.e., urban development, land title, 
sites and services, slumps upgrading, housing finance, etc). 
•  To enable the Bank to provide technical assistance to help government authorities in 
establishing an appropriate regulatory environment in which to plan the development of 
rental market projects that will be delivered by the private sector.  
This  paper  will  help  LAC  countries  to  better  understand  the  implications  of  developing  a 
rental housing market as an integrated part of the overall housing system.  
Traditional development and shelter assistance programs have focused on either large 
scale public housing development, which have largely fallen out of favor, or on homeownership 
assistance. Even though 20 to 40 percent of people in the LAC region rent their dwellings, only a 
negligible proportion of any subsidy is directed to renters (Sunil, 1996; Buckley and Kalarickal, 
2006). Rental tenure rates also appear to be somewhat lower in the developing countries in Latin 
American and the Caribbean when compared with other developing countries in Africa and Asia 
(Andreasen, 1996; Gilbert et al., 1997).  
Experience in northern and developed countries suggests that a well functioning rental 
sector (potentially including both social and private renting) is an important component of a 
complete  and  effective  housing  system,  offering  more  solutions  to  meet  a  full  spectrum  of  
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demands and needs. As such, it is appropriate to explore the opportunities for the IDB to support 
the rental options alongside the traditional lending and program focus that has generally favored 
homeownership.    
This paper seeks to outline the existing tenure patterns across LAC countries, identify the 
prerequisite  features  of  effective  rental  sectors—based  on  experience  in  developed  OECD 
countries—, and outline the necessary steps to develop and expand the rental sector in LAC 
countries. This includes consideration of both the private (private investors) and community 
rental sector (community based nonprofit and cooperative ownership).  
2  Setting the Context   
2.1  The IDB’s Intervention in the Development of the Housing Sector in Latin America 
The IDB’s knowledge in housing is significant. Between 1998 and 2008, the Bank approved 
approximately US$3.8 million in housing programs and technical cooperation. The operational 
experience and knowledge in this sector has been focused mainly on slum upgrading programs 
(58 percent of all housing programs approved by the Bank), direct demand subsidies, and the 
development of mortgage markets (with a focus on mortgage loans for homeownership, not for 
investor lending).    
These programs have improved the housing stock in the LAC region, and have expanded 
access to new houses for families with moderate income. However, they have had limited results 
in  the  provision  of  policy  alternatives  to  prevent  the  formation  of  new  slums  and  to 
accommodate the demand for new houses for low-income families. The prevalence of informal 
settlements  in  the  region  has  affected  not  only  housing  market  outcomes,  but  also  the 
sustainability of cities. 
The policy response to housing problems (quality and affordability) in the LAC region 
has, in most cases, ignored rental housing as a vehicle to provide adequate housing solutions for 
low-  and  moderate-income  families.  This  is  however  not  unique  to  LAC  countries  or  other 
developing countries; the political and financial support in most developed countries over the  
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past  six  postwar  decades  has  similarly  emphasized  the  social  rented  sector  and  the  owner 
occupied sector (Whitehead 1996). 
Most countries in the LAC region have negligible or inexistent rental housing policies 
and programs. The Bank’s main policy response in the region has been towards improving the 
informal  housing  stock  with  slum  upgrading  programs  and  improving  affordability  through 
direct or indirect subsidies to low- and moderate-income families for the purchase of a new 
housing unit. Recent evaluations of housing programs in Latin America and the Caribbean have 
shown  that  slum  upgrading  programs,  although  important,  are  too  focused  on  solving  the 
problems of the housing stock and are doing too little to prevent new informal developments 
(Rojas, 2009). 
Subsidy programs (emphasizing improved conditions) have been less effective in reaching 
low-income families and have encountered problems such as the unsustainable levels of subsidy 
requirements, the lack of private mortgage financing for the targeted groups, the greater distance 
and segregation of social housing developments, the increased pressure on public services and 
infrastructure, and the limits on social and work mobility (Ruprah, 2009). There are several Bank 
studies  underway  focusing  on  public  housing  policies,  housing  finance,  land  markets,  and 
municipal provision of housing services, but the studies of the rental housing market are limited.
1 
The  Bank  wants  to  fill  an  important  gap  in  this  sector  and  support  its  housing  and  urban 
development niche by identifying barriers and opportunities to develop the rental housing market 
in general, and affordable housing alternatives in particular. This conceptual paper presents some 
policy and program instruments that could help LAC governments to support and expand rental 
housing markets and make it affordable for low-income families. 
2.2  Current Tenure Patterns  
Data on tenure reveal that the rental sector in most LAC countries is small; typically less than 
one-fifth  of  all  households  rent  (Figure  1).  Moreover,  this  proportion  is  either  stagnant  or 
                                                 
1 For example, (RG-K1099) Public Housing Policies; (RG-K1125) Housing Finance; (RG-K1154) Land Markets; 
and (RG-K1153) Municipal Provision of Housing Services.  
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contracting.
2 Unlike the situation in developed northern countries, either there is little formal 
regulation and many tenants do not enjoy secure tenure or there are overly restrictive occupancy 
regulations  that  discourage  investment  and  create  an  illegal  secondary  market  as  original 
occupants sell their occupancy rights (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006). Even when contracts do 
exist between owners and tenants, they are typically short-term contracts and tenants remain 
vulnerable to sudden and significant increase in rents (Environment and Urbanization, 1997). 
 
  Data also reveal that on average two-thirds of the households own outright and do so 
without outstanding debt, while a minority of owners (under 10 percent) carry mortgage debt. In 
part, low levels of mortgaged households reflect constrained access to financing, possibly related 
to absence of or a weak land registry system (fundamental to registering mortgages) as well as an 
underdeveloped  housing  finance  system.  The  ownership  data  presented  in  Figure  1  include 
informal ownership, wherein dwellings are occupied without a title deed or services, and which 
the  household  members  design,  finance,  and  often  build  with  their  own  hands.  The  term 
“informal housing” is used synonymously with self-help and spontaneous housing. The label 
“other” includes categories such as invaders (squatters), people who live in a dwelling of their 
company (employee housing), a friend, or a family. Also included in “other” in Figure 1 are 
households that declare ownership of the house but not the land on which it is situated. 
                                                 
2 Official statistics provided here by the IDB, compiled by Inder Ruprah and Nadin Madelin with data from national 
housing surveys, identify formal rental tenure; however this may under-represent the total as many may rent their 
homes on an informal basis. Such households are recorded here in the category “other.”  
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  International  development  programs  typically  focus  on  building  infrastructure, 
establishing  mechanisms  to  register  and  formalize  land  ownership,  and  removing  slum 
conditions. These frequently incorporate homeownership assistance as a way to stabilize the 
population, a factor that may contribute to the size and growth of the ownership sector. However, 
many assisted ownership programs have not been effective in reaching low-income households.  
In  some  cases  international  development  funding  has  been  used  to  develop  public 
housing, albeit with limited success, as is the case in northern countries. Public housing often 
suffers from design issues, misses the main segment of the population in need, and does not 
encourage  resident  contributions.  In  others  it  over  concentrates  low-income  households, 
exacerbating  poverty  issues.  There  is  need  for  an  ongoing  administrative  regime  and  large 
subsidies  (Buckley  and  Kalarickal,  2006).  Meanwhile,  few  development  initiatives  have 
explicitly identified or tried to establish a strong rented sector, other than via public ownership. 
In addition to being small, the rented sector in many LAC countries displays a very different 
profile than that in older developed nations.  
In most northern countries, housing systems have emerged with a mix of tenures and 
continuum from public or social renting through private renting to ownership. The size of each 
sector varies considerably, reflecting both cultural differences and policy approaches. Regulatory 
regimes have been established to provide some degree of security of tenure, to establish tenant 
rights,  to  protect  tenants  from  eviction  or  excessive  rates  of  rent  increase,  and  to  create  a 
framework  and  process  to  mediate  disputes  between  tenants  and  landlords  (Fraser  Institute, 
1975; Whitehead, 1996). 
Generally, in the developed nations, household incomes increase along this continuum 
(social renting-private renting-ownership), as both social and private renting perform the role of 
transitional tenures. Renters tend to be younger, reflecting people leaving the family home and 
forming a new household, either with friends or as a result of marriage.
3 Many renters are at the 
                                                 
3 Historically senior households (65+) were also highly represented in rental stock as many sought apartments as 
they downsized from family homes. However, in North America at least, the introduction of strata titling, known as 
condominiums, has enabled many to move to an apartment form while retaining ownership status.   
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beginning of their careers, and have not accumulated the wealth necessary to purchase a home. 
Some also tend to seek greater mobility, a feature offered by rental options (Leal, 1994). So, 
while renting is a transitional stage of lifecycle tenure for many, for some, notably those of lower 
income, it is a lifelong tenure.  
Historically,  rental  housing  expanded  in  the  northern  countries  during  periods  of 
industrialization  and  urbanization.  The  growth  of  rental  sectors  was  a  natural  market 
phenomenon, not initially policy driven. Policy and regulatory frameworks were later additions 
to the system, largely in response to the emergence of tenant rights organizations, as well as 
traditions in civil law. Increasing regulation levels are often associated with contraction of the 
private rented sector (Fraser Institute, 1975; Whitehead, 1996). A similar tendency is occurring 
in LAC countries, with rapid urbanization causing an absolute deficiency in housing supply in 
growing cities, which in turn imposes price pressure on the existing stock. The unregulated 
response to unmet demand and need is an increase in invaders and slum development. In the 
context of rapid urbanization in developing countries, the housing shortage constitutes one of the 
greatest challenges to social and economic development. 
In developed northern countries, renters tend to have a lower income than owners, and 
the incidence of renting tends to be very high in the lowest-income quintiles and very small in 
high-income quintiles (CMHC, 2010). As shown in Figure 2, the situation is different in LAC 
countries. In all cases the proportion of the population that rent their homes is higher in the 
highest-income quintiles and very low in the lowest quintiles. This is the inverse of the case in 
developed northern countries, suggesting both different institutional arrangements and different 
cultural norms.  
  7 
  In LAC countries rental options have not been developed as a shelter option for lower-
income families, and rental tenure is more associated with wealth. For example, in Bolivia a 
widely used feature of the rental system is large lump prepayments or loans (anti-credito). In 
return for this payment or loan, the renter secures a right to occupy for a fixed period, often up to 
two years. This anti-credito became popular in periods of inflation, as it is a source of capital to 
owners. The effective rent is the foregone interest and depreciated value of the lump some when 
repaid. However, because this requires a large capital sum, it tends to favor wealthier middle-
class renters over those with lower income.  
In short, the rental market in the LAC region is not very developed. The policy response 
to housing problems (quality and affordability) has, in most cases, ignored rental housing as a 
vehicle  to  provide  adequate  housing  solutions  for  low-  and  moderate-income  families  (UN-
Habitat, 2003). As a result, most countries in the region have negligible or inexistent rental 
housing policies and programs. Arguably, the small and stagnant rented sector in LAC countries 
reflects  an  incomplete  housing  system.  Strengthening  the  rental  sector  may  be  an  option  to 
increase opportunities to address housing demand and concurrently help in managing poverty 
issues. A larger more effective rental sector can also enhance labor mobility and productivity. 
This  paper  first  examines  the  characteristics  of  rental  markets  and  systems  in  developed 
countries, and then draws on these experiences to provide options for developing LAC countries   
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3  Rental Market Development in Developed Countries 
Across most developed countries the level of rental tenure expanded as part of the rural-urban 
migration through the latter part of the  eighteenth century and through the mid-1900s, mainly in 
response  to  demand  by  a  new  urban  labor  force.  This  was  supported,  in  part,  by  employer 
sponsored housing, although demand also prompted the emergence of commercial landlords, 
initially on an informal and unregulated basis. Over time, the rental sector gradually became 
subject to regulation, initially based on health and safety concerns, but subsequently to control 
rents  and  protect  tenant  occupancy  rights.  In  most  European  countries,  as  well  as  in  North 
America, rent restrictions were imposed during the two periods of world wars and in many 
countries persisted beyond (Fraser Institute, 1975).  
With suppressed rents and rising costs due to new postwar demand, a large gap emerged 
between cost-based rents and regulated rents (Hayak, 1975; De Jouvenal, 1975). While control 
regimes were adjusted in some countries, in most the fear of massive increases to market based 
levels and the politicization of this issue was a strong deterrent to deregulation. This was the 
beginning of unfavorable conditions for rental investment, a situation that has persisted over 
much of the postwar period in many northern/western nations.  
The postwar policy response to an undersupply of new rental construction generally took 
the form of direct public investment and the emergence and expansion of public and social 
housing  sectors,  particularly  in  European  countries.  Here  the  public/social  stock  legacy  is 
generally much larger than is the case in the former dominions in North America and the South 
Pacific (New Zealand and Australia), countries where there was no destruction of stock, a more 
liberal form of postwar welfare state and less pressure to regulate postwar rents. In these less 
regulated environments an active private investor sector became the primary source of new rental 
construction and provision.  
The  United  States  and  Canada  also  implemented  specific  policies  and  financing 
mechanisms to support and enable private rental investment for new rental development and also 
enacted (or temporarily re-enacted) favorable tax legislation—policy levers that contributed to  
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the emergence of large-scale developer-investors that constructed and operated large portfolios 
of multiunit apartment buildings.
4 These stimuli persisted through the 1980s.  
Since 1978, notwithstanding the initial growth of rental housing, in most industrialized 
counties there has been a gradual decline in the size of the rental sector, and more particularly in 
the size of the private rented sector (Whitehead, 1996; Van der Heijen and Boelhouwer, 1996). 
Since  the  1970s,  the  private  rented  sector  has  contracted  in  most  OECD  countries,  Austria, 
Germany, and Japan being the exceptions (Lampert et al., 1998; Italian Housing Federation, 
2006). This reflects demographic factors, shifting demand levels and consumer preferences, the 
relative  viability  of  ownership  versus  rental  options  as  well  as  the  regulatory  taxation  and 
subsidy regime in each country (Boelhouwer, 1996; Whitehead, 1996; Lampert et al., 1998).  
A public policy shift occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, from bricks and mortar (new 
housing construction, supply side) to consumer-oriented subsidies (focused on demand side). 
The  rental  market  for  low-income  households  was  viewed  as  an  income  problem  and  the 
response was thus to institute rent assistance programs (as opposed to rental supply programs). In 
this  case,  governments  strived  to  complement  private  sector  initiatives  (as  opposed  to 
competing).  However,  research  and  analysis  showed  that  rent  assistance  programs  were  not 
sufficient to induce an adequate supply of low-income rental housing (Fraser Institute, 1975; 
Kemp, 1990; Husle, 2001).  
The question of what constitutes the optimal balance between income-related assistance 
and  other  forms  of  subsidies  is  still  a  major  component  of  housing  policy  debates  in  many 
countries (Kemp, 1990; Pomeroy 2008). With the size of the private rental sector contracting, a 
number of countries have explored ways to reverse this trend and some have developed and 
implemented policies and programs to stimulate private investment (Crook and Kemp, 1996). 
One study (Lampert et al., 1998) examined the experience across 10 developed OECD 
countries to determine what approaches have been effective. This report focuses on policies 
                                                 
4 This included favorable lending rates, incentive grants, loans, and tax measures—in the United States accelerated 
depreciation and in Canada a temporary measure to allow passive investors to deduct losses against other 
(nonrelated to real estate) income.    
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developed at the national scale, although it also notes some instances where ancillary initiatives 
were added at the local scale (essentially facilitative measures, such as fast-tracking development 
approvals  relaxing  land  use  regulation).  The  study  finds  that  the  most  extensive  approach 
involves  facilitative  measures  with  a  strong  emphasis  on  deregulation  of  rent  controls  and 
implementation of reformed regulatory systems that seek a balance between tenant protection 
(security  of  occupancy)  and  a  fair  return  to  investors.  The  need  to  minimize  uncertainty  is 
highlighted as a critical precondition to private investment.  A number of countries have also 
employed tax provisions to enhance after tax yields as a way to encourage investment. Direct 
subsidy expenditures are found in only three of the ten countries—the Netherlands employs 
small  capital  grants  while  Japan  and  Sweden  sustain  pre-existing  interest  rate  subsidies  (a 
mechanism used in the 1960s and 1970s in both Canada and the United States).  
Lampert et al. (1998) also find that only two countries, Australia and New Zealand, have 
implemented and maintained healthy investment environments without direct subsidy. Notably, 
neither country has onerous rent controls, both permit depreciation and deductibility of rental 
losses against other income (an incentive to small, noncorporate investors), and both involve a 
common structure, mainly detached dwellings which fluctuate between ownership and the rented 
sector. They are distinct from the structures with multipurpose units that are more typically 
associated with rental tenure in North America.   
3.1  Lessons from this Historical Background 
It terms of exploring opportunities to strengthen and expand the rented sector in developing LAC 
countries, some insights can be drawn from the experience in the developed OECD countries, 
both during periods of expansion and subsequent contraction of the private rented sector.  
Perhaps  the  most  critical  lesson  is  that  as  governments  in  developed  countries  have 
increased their level of intervention, private investment and expansion of the private rental sector 
has contracted. That is not to say that regulation is bad, but sometimes, regulatory frameworks 
create  uncertainty  and  impose  barriers  to  investment.  Others  have  introduced  a  level  of 
competition that is too high for many private investors. The challenge is to find the right balance 
to  achieve  regulatory  objectives  (e.g.,  establish  reasonable  security  of  occupancy)  without 
penalizing potential investors. Shlomo (2000) describes a well-functioning housing system as  
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one in which investors and producers of housing stock are indifferent to building properties for 
owner occupancy or rental use and consumers are similarly indifferent to owning or renting. This 
is clearly not the case in most developed countries. Together, housing subsidies, tax treatment of 
investment  income,  and  regulation  contribute  to  a  distorting  effect  on  housing  markets  and 
consumption patterns and generally favor home-ownership.  
Another  major  failure  of  housing  policy  and  programs  in  developed  countries  is  a 
segmented intervention rather than a systemic intervention. Policies in many countries, notably 
the Anglo-speaking ones including Australia, the United States, and the UK and, to a lesser 
extent,  Canada,  have  emphasized  encouraging  and  facilitating  homeownership  (as  an  almost 
singular policy goal). This is reflected in the more favorable tax treatment of homeowners, such 
as exemption from capital gains tax, nontaxation of imputed rent, and, in some countries, tax 
deductibility of mortgage interest. The United States has adopted specific policies to increase the 
rate  of  homeownership  (under  both  the  Clinton  administration  between  1992  and  2000  and 
subsequently  the  Bush  administration  between  2000  and  2008),  and  generally  has  provided 
favorable below-market interest rates and underwriting mechanisms to increase access to home 
financing.  
Similarly, in developing countries, international multilateral and bilateral organizations 
have centered most of their interventions on increasing homeownership levels, but it is not clear 
as to whether this policy has had a positive impact. There are rising concerns in developed 
countries that promoting high rates of ownership can be counterproductive. Rates have peaked 
and  declined  (for  example  in  New  Zealand,  Australia,  and  more  recently  under  the  global 
financial crisis in the United States). The UN-Habitat (2003) has suggested that it is not possible 
to achieve or sustain high rates of ownership on a universal level. 
Against these proactive efforts to promote ownership, levels of new rental construction 
have suffered as demand is diverted into the ownership sector and rental yields decline. These 
policies reinforce cultural beliefs and perceptions that it is better to own than to rent, and have 
the  effect  of  stereotyping  renters  as  second-class  citizens.  Other  countries,  such  as  Austria, 
Germany, and Sweden, have sought to maintain a more tenure neutral framework (including 
regulation, subsidy, and taxation) to achieve and sustain more balanced housing systems with a  
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wider  choice  across  social  renting,  private  renting,  and  homeownership.  Policy  initiatives  in 
developing  countries  should  seek  to  emulate  these  more  balanced  and  complementary 
approaches. However, in the short term it may be necessary to emphasize and favor policies and 
incentives that enable and encourage growth of the rented sector, as a way to compensate for 
previous imbalance in favor of ownership.  
Housing is an inherently expensive good and requires a significant capital investment. 
Ideally, housing systems should enable and encourage private investment to the greatest extent 
possible to avoid large and unsustainable levels of public investment. It should be noted that 
while  discussed  here  in  a  generic  fashion,  the  characteristics  of  the  rental  sector  vary 
substantially across countries. This includes significant differences in: 
•  The  characteristics  of  consumers,  encompassing  only  the  lowest-income  populations 
versus a broader range of incomes;  
•  The  physical  form  of  the  rental  stock—individual  homes  or  attached  houses  versus 
multiunit apartment blocks; and  
•  The characteristics of landlords, including both social and private operators as well as a 
significant  variation  between  small  individual  investors  (usually  renting  a  single 
dwelling),  corporate  professional  developer-landlords  (that  create  purpose  built  rental 
stock), and institutional investors. The latter are more common in North America and 
tend to invest in existing properties rather than participate in development.  
The regulatory, taxation and subsidy regimes may have different influences depending on the 
characteristics  of  the  consumer  and  investor  groups.  Across  the  LAC  countries  these 
characteristics will also vary. Accordingly, there is no single prescription that can or should be 
applied across all countries; rather it is necessary to examine the current conditions and existing 
institutional and regulatory arrangements, and then design policy interventions to either optimize 
or  correct  existing  conditions.  It  is  also  important  to  examine  and  define  the  nature  of  the 
housing problem. Is there an absolute lack of supply, in which case measures may be required to 
stimulate construction? Why is there a lack of supply; are there land constraints, labor constraint, 
or lack of financing? Is there a group of investors that is willing to participate in creating purpose  
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built rental supply? If there is sufficient supply (stock) but also difficulties in terms of access and 
affordability,  rental  assistance,  rather  than  supply  stimulus,  may  be  necessary.  It  could  also 
involve acquisition of existing stock by special purpose corporations, such as community-based 
nonprofit  entities  with  a  mandate  and  mission  to  provide  and  preserve  rental  housing  at 
affordable prices.  
In short, it is possible to create and implement policies to influence and manage issues related 
to both supply or demand. However, to do so it is important to define policy issues, objectives, 
and priorities.  
4  Sustaining a Viable Rental Sector  
Based  on  the  comparative  analysis  of  Lampert  et  al.  (1998),  the  critical  elements  of  rental 
systems include both a set of prerequisite conditions as well as a set of ancillary features that 
help sustain and enhance the private rental sector.  
Prerequisite conditions: 
•  Established and effective urban land market 
•  Effective  land  title  registration  and  regulatory  framework  (to  facilitate  registration  of 
mortgages and secure property rights) 
•  Effective housing finance system (including mortgage insurance) 
•  Regulatory framework to balance security of occupancy rights against reasonable returns 
for investors 
Ancillary conditions: 
•  Taxation framework that avoids inequitable treatment of rental investment relative to 
alternate investments and may include incentives for rental investment 
•  Subsidy  system  that  stimulates  and  encourages  private  investment  and  supports  non-
profit community based development and ownership  
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•  Planning system to facilitate rental options (Linkage and inclusionary requirements). 
4.1  Elaborating on Prerequisite and Ancillary Conditions 
Established and Effective Urban Land Market 
The issue of well functioning land markets is fundamental to housing supply and a broad concern 
beyond the narrow scope of this conceptual paper. To the extent that a supply issue exists in any 
country,  there  is  a  need  to  enable  production  and  this  may  be  in  the  form  of  either  owner 
occupation or rental, but either case requires an underlying system of land management and 
servicing.  
Even  with  effective  land  management,  in  liberal  market  systems  there  is  an  ongoing 
challenge in promoting or stimulating a full range of housing options. In the Anglo countries, 
planning and zoning provisions do not generally provide for specification of tenure or value of 
the dwellings constructed. These outcomes are increasingly left to market forces, albeit typically 
skewed by policies that tend to favor the ownership sector. Historically, multiunit designation 
(apartment structures) in zoning codes was synonymous with rental tenure, mainly because it 
was not possible to legally separate one structure into multiple ownership parcels. However, the 
introduction of three-dimensional “strata titling” has enabled the creation of legal parcels and 
thus  the  ability  to  sell  parts  of  buildings  as  individual  properties  (commonly  labeled  as 
condominiums in North America, referring to the “strata titling” legislation). Thus the notion of a 
“purpose built” rental sector does not really exist in many countries—notably Australia, New 
Zealand, and the UK. Moreover this system is disappearing in North America as condominium 
apartments now dominate multiunit apartment construction.  
What is emerging, however, is a transformation in the type of supply, which is now often 
constructed as tenure neutral stock. Sweden prides itself on a tenure neutral system (Van Heiden 
and  Boulhouwer,  1996;  Connelly  et  al.,  2010).  Properties,  including  detached  homes  and 
apartments in multiunit structures, are sold on the free market and may be purchased by an 
owner occupant or by an investor seeking a rental property. This is much closer to the approach 
that prevails in Australia, New Zealand, and the UK , which usually involves detached and 
semidetached dwellings rented out through a large number of small investors. The key point here  
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is  that  a  well  functioning  planning  and  development  system  must  be  established  to  address 
demand for new supply in the rental market.  
2. Effective Land Title Registration and Regulatory Framework to Support an Effective 
Finance System 
Housing  (and  indeed  all  real  estate)  is  a  capital-intensive  commodity.  Even  in  northern 
developing countries, it is unusual for people to purchase dwellings with cash, especially for 
those consumers with low and modest income at the market entry level. Over much of the past 
century, housing finance systems have been developed to provide the capital necessary to fund 
the purchase of properties. The housing finance system is premised on a sound system of land 
titles  and  registration  in  order  to  clearly  identify  ownership  and  concurrently  to  enable 
registration of deeds and liens against these titles as a basis of security for the capital loans 
provided  to  purchasers.  Policies  to  facilitate  access  to  mortgage  finance  have  favored  the 
ownership sector, but in some countries the benefits of a sound housing finance system have 
extended to the rental sector—both for private investors and in the public and social rented 
sectors. This was especially the case in Canada, where initially direct government loans (1964–
1978) and subsequently public mortgage insurance enabled developers of rental properties to 
readily access mortgage financing.    
To promote and sustain development and investment in existing assets, it is critical to 
have  a  formal  system  to  recognize  and  catalogue  land  and  property  ownership  as  a  way  to 
facilitate registration of mortgages and secure property rights 
3. Regulatory Framework to Balance Property Rights and Security of Occupancy 
As renters in all developed countries include a lower-income population, there has traditionally 
been a strong regulatory framework to provide some protection and security of occupancy. Many 
analysts have associated high levels of regulation with the steady decline in rental tenure. Most 
Western  European  countries  experienced  a  dramatic  decline  in  the  postwar  period,  with  the 
private rented sector declining from over half of all housing to less than one-fifth (Van Heiden 
and Boulhouwer, 1996). The key to an effective rental sector is a balanced regulatory framework  
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that  protects  occupancy  rights  of  tenancy  without  imposing  excess  risk  on  investors  or 
suppressing rent levels to the point that return on investment to property owners is unattractive.  
Rent regulation typically includes two main elements. The first is security of occupancy, 
which essentially establishes duration of occupancy as well as limits opportunities for landlords 
to remove tenants except for specified and usually limited reasons. The closely associated second 
element is a control on levels of rent increase, intended both to preserve affordability and to 
preclude  de  facto  economic  eviction,  which  would  occur  if  rents  increase  well  beyond  the 
tenant’s ability to pay.  
These rent control regimes tend to establish the amount and frequency of rent increase 
(typically limited to a single annual increase) and the rate of increase often set by regulation and 
linked to some measure such as the consumer price index. In some jurisdictions, restrictions on 
rent increase are maintained only during a sitting tenancy, but once a unit is vacated there is no 
restriction and rents may be adjusted to a level that the market will bear (vacancy decontrol); 
however the controls are put back into place once a new tenant occupies the unit/dwelling. Few 
jurisdictions have found a way to balance efforts to protect tenant rights with the necessity to 
concurrently enable investors to generate a sufficient rate of return to remain invested in this 
sector, and more important, to invest in additional production.  
Canada provides a useful contrast of rent regulation regimes wherein some provinces 
have progressed through a period of deregulation, yet this has not resulted in significant levels of 
rental  housing  production  (e.g.,  in  the  provinces  of  BC  and  Ontario)  mainly  because  of  the 
uncertainty  people  have  about  whether  future  governments  will  reintroduce  more  restrictive 
controls.  Ontario  in  particular  has  gone  through  five  sets  of  new  legislation  and  related 
regulatory reform since 1975. Those of the late 1990s were specifically intended to deregulate 
and thus encourage investment, although this has not yet occurred. 
Quebec,  meanwhile,  has  retained  a  consistent  and  well-established  regulatory  system 
with  a  reasonable  balance  between  protecting  tenants  and  encouraging  investment.  Because 
Quebec’s regulatory system has been in place for a prolonged period with minimal revision (or 
threat of increase to levels of regulation), it is accepted by and capitalized into the market. In 
contrast,  the  system  in  other  provinces,  where  there  have  been  ongoing  revisions  to  the  
  17 
legislation and a general trend to deregulation, there is lingering doubt and concern that controls 
will be reintroduced. This uncertainty in the market has resulted in a highly cautious, if not 
disinterested, rental investment community. The key insight from this experience is that it is not 
only controls and regulation that discourage investment, but uncertainty and risk of a potentially 
changing regime also affect investment decisions. 
As part of it regulatory regime, the province of Quebec has established a quasi-judicial 
board, the Regie du Logement (RDL), to help manage the regulatory process (see Box 1). Other 
provinces have followed this approach, but as noted, the role and regulations of these boards 
have  been  subject  to  reform  (e.g.,  Ontario  introduced  a  tribunal  in  1998,  and  subsequently 
revised its mandate under the 2006 Residential Tenancies Act).  
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Box 1. Regulating the Rental Market: The Case of “Regie du Logement du Quebec (RDL)” 
The  “Regie  du  Logement  du  Quebec  (RDL)”  was  adopted  in  1980  (L.Q.  1979  c.  38).  The  Quebec 
Government introduced a new mechanism to regulate the relationships between “landlords and tenants.” 
The latter modified the civil code and formalized the regulatory framework for the rental market. RDL is 
an administrative tribunal governed by the civil code and as a “quasi-judicial” specialized tribunal. Its 
main mission includes the following: 
•  Promote conciliation between landlords and tenants; 
•  Resolve  disputes  between  landlords  and  tenants  by  deciding  the  applications  that  have  been 
submitted within the framework of simple rules of procedure dictated by the civil code; 
•  Inform citizens about their rights and obligations related to the lease.  
Since  1996,  the  use  of  a  standardized  lease  form  is  mandatory  for  any  residential  lease,  whether  it 
involves a room, a separate suite in a house, an apartment, or an entire house, among other types. Once 
the form is signed, it is binding.   
An important role of the RDL is to provide an annual rent increase guideline that determines the level of 
increase landlords are allowed to request and can usually impose on tenants. These rent increases are 
based on a methodology developed by the RDL, reflecting general inflation and other factors that impact 
the rental market. However, landlords may also seek an increase above the guideline. If the tenant thinks 
the  increase  is  unjustified,  he  or  she  can  contact  the  RDL  to  request  an  assessment  on  whether  the 
increase is justified. The RDL will convene a hearing for both parties, and will render a decision on 
whether the rent increase is appropriate. In addition, RDL hears cases in which tenants or landlords are 
seeking to settle a dispute, such as wrongful eviction or failure to pay rent. Based on a RDL court order, 
the landlord can evict a tenant after three months of nonpayment of rent. In 2009, it took five weeks to get 
a  RDL  court  order.  Also,  the  RDL  can  decide  on  any  application  pertaining  to  the  conservation  of 
dwellings and the protection of tenants, such as the following: 
•  Demolition of a dwelling where there is no municipal regulation that provides for it;  
•  Sale of a rental building within a building complex; and 
•  Transformation of residential buildings into divided co-ownership. 
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4. Taxation Framework 
The  tax  treatment  of  rental  investment  income  has  proven  to  be  a  critical  factor  in  either 
stimulating  (Australia,  France,  Germany,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  )  or  conversely 
discouraging  (United  States,  Canada)  private  rental  investment.  Typically,  more  favorable 
regimes permit accelerated depreciation and the ability to use both cash and paper (depreciation) 
losses to reduce taxable net income for passive investors whose income is generated from outside 
of the property sector. This tends to have a more significant impact on small investors compared 
to corporate and institutional investors, although in the 1980’s the syndication of tax sheltering 
opportunities  effectively  created  opportunities  for  developers  to  assemble  investment  from 
numerous high-income individuals and produce multiunit apartment developments.  
Both Canada and United States significantly reduced and constrained tax advantages for 
rental  investors  in  the  early  to  mid-1970s,  although  in  both  countries  temporary  measures 
restored attractive tax regimes and helped to temporarily stimulate investment (augmented by 
subsidy initiatives). These typically included restoring and accelerating depreciation allowances 
as well as permitting actual as well as paper losses (notional depreciation) to be deducted from 
non real estate income.  
Over the past decade in some developed countries, such as Canada and Australia, there 
has  been  great  debate  over  the  introduction  of  targeted  tax  measures  to  help  investors  or 
landlords in the private rental market. In 2002–2003, the Canadian Ministry of Finance and 
provincial finance ministries conducted an analysis on this matter to determine whether new tax 
measures could help landlords/investors produce and maintain an affordable housing stock for 
low-income  households.  They  concluded  that  the  structure  proposed  by  most  of  the  market 
participants  was  an  inefficient  (the  loss  of  tax  revenues  for  the  government  outweighed  the 
economic impact) and inappropriate solution for maintaining a sustainable stock of affordable 
rental units.  
More recently, researchers in Canada (Pomeroy, 2006) and Australia (Brotherhood and 
CEDA, 2004) have considered the introduction of a tax measure based on the American Low-
income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. The LIHTC provides tax incentives for investors 
in affordable housing. The target audience of the LIHTC program is households with incomes at  
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or below 60 percent of the area median family income, and preference is given to households 
earning only 50 percent of the area median income. The main purpose of the tax credit is to 
induce private equity investment and thereby reduce debt servicing costs to ensure a sustainable 
stock  of  affordable  housing  for  low-income  households.  However,  while  tax  credits  can 
effectively influence investor behavior, such tax credit mechanisms do not generate affordable 
housing without subsidies. Tax expenditures, but not collecting tax revenues otherwise payable, 
are  simply  a  different  way  to  structure  subsidies  and  still  impact  the  fiscal  positions  of  the 
governments. 
In addition to the tax treatment of rental investment, how other investment options are 
treated also has some influence on the rental sector. For example favorable treatment of the 
ownership sector (including nontaxation of capital gains and mortgage interest deductibility) 
encourage households (especially modest-middle income earners) to become homeowners. The 
residual rental sector then tends to be dominated by lower-income households with more limited 
levels  of  effective  demand,  and  lower  rent  levels,  undermining  the  attraction  of  rental 
investment.  
5. Subsidy System 
Most developed nations have, at various times, sought to encourage expanded housing supply 
specifically through rental development. This includes a wide range of mechanisms directed to 
stimulate private rental investment as well as direct funding support for the development and 
expansion of the social rental sector. 
In the private rentals sector, when subsidies have been used, this has taken the form of 
preferable  (below  market)  interest  rates  (Canada,  Germany,  Japan,  Sweden,  United  States), 
forgivable loans and outright grants (Canada, Netherlands). In most cases the quid pro quo for 
this support has involved some form of agreement to maintain rents at some defined affordable 
level over a prescribed duration (e.g., Germany, Netherlands).   
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  In  the  initial  post  war  period,  most 
countries,  and  especially  those  of  Western 
Europe  faced  with  massive  rebuilding, 
employed direct subsidy for public and social 
housing.  The  trend  from  the  1980s  on  has 
been away from these direct supply subsidy 
expenditures.  Approaches  have  shifted  to  a 
combination of rent deregulation coupled with 
person based shelter allowance approaches.  
  The  (former)  significant  level  of 
subsidy  support  for  the  public  and  social 
sectors was in a negative influence on private 
investment  in  many  countries.  The  social 
sectors were initially not targeted only to low-
income households, yet they provided general 
rental supply and competed with the private 
sector for tenants. 
One of the interesting approaches in a 
number  of  European  countries  is  a  rental 
subsidy system (mainly via reduced interest programs) that does not distinguish between social 
and  private  developers/owners,  and  thus  seeks  to  avoid  the  crowding  out  competition  that 
prevails  in  countries  where  direct  subsidies  are  provided  only  to  social  landlords.  In  the 
Netherlands and Sweden, these subsidy systems promote general rental supply while a separate 
system of housing allowances is also neutral and low-income tenants are accordingly distributed 
across both the private and the social (municipal) stock.  
  The US has implemented a sustained a production program that creates units at modest 
affordable rents (generally limited to rents affordable at 30 percent of income to households 
earning between 50 and  60 percent of median family income in each locality). It too includes for 
profit and nonprofit sponsors. While premised on a set of tax incentives, these are targeted on 
Box 2. Canada Rental Supply Program  (CRSP) 
This program was introduced in 1981 with the 
objective of stimulating private rental investment in 
cities with tight rental vacancy rates. It targeted the 
production of 30,000 new rental dwellings over three 
years (1982–1984). The result of the program was 
actual production of roughly 24,000 rental units over 
the three years (CMHC, 1988). 
The mechanism used was an interest-free loan  that 
was designed to reduce the amount of investor equity 
required for the development to be viable. The 
maximum assistance was calculated at the difference 
between 80 percent of cost and the level of mortgage 
financing the project could carry at market rents, after 
allowing for approved operating expenses and a fair 
return on equity to the investor. The maximum 
amount of the loan was $7,500 per unit.   
The loan was secured as a second mortgage on title 
and no payments of either principal or interest were 
required for 15 years. After 15 years, the property 
owner had the option of repaying the original capital 
amount as a lump sum or amortizing the amount with 
ongoing interest payments at the then prevailing 
government direct lending rate.  
There was no restriction on rent, but owners were 
obligated to offer 33 percent of the units to provinces 
for rent supplement tenants (a separate contract to 
provide a subsidy lowering net rent to eligible low 
income tenants (see box 4 ). As such, the primary 
objective was to stimulate supply/construction of 
rental units.  
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potential corporate investors that purchase tax credits, such that for project developers the form 
of assistance is effectively a grant (with an extensive conditions and compliance regime).  
  Boxes 2 and 3 illustrate two ways to 
either stimulate construction or both support 
construction  and  address  an  affordability 
objective.  A  third  approach  is  rental 
assistance  (Box  4),  which  operates 
separately but is connected to general supply 
initiatives.  The  advantage  of  rental 
assistance is that it can address affordability 
issues without incurring the cost to build. As 
such, this option is effective only where a 
large  stock  of  existing  rental  housing 
already exists (as in the United States and 
Canada),  but  is  not  affordable  to  lower-
income individuals and families. As Box 4 
shows,  rental  assistance  can  be  tied  to 
specific  properties  (rent  supplements)  or 
managed  as  a  general  income  supplement 
linked  to  excess  housing  expenditure 
(housing or shelter allowance).  
6.  Planning  Systems  to  Facilitate  Rental 
Options  
Although not a major feature of rental systems, various jurisdictions have sought to use planning 
and  development  approval  processes  to  encourage  rental  development  (usually  with  some 
affordability objectives). This is widespread in the UK, where inclusion of affordable housing is 
almost  mandatory  as  part  of  the  development  approval  process,  and  more  often  than  not  is 
associated  with  development  partnerships  between  private  developers  (building  for  the 
ownership market) and social landlords (via linkage and inclusionary requirements). In most 
Box 3. Nonprofit Housing Program (1978–1985) 
This is one of a number of programs introduced in 
Canada. The objective was twofold: to generate supply 
of rental units and to ensure they are made available at 
rents affordable to low-moderate income individuals 
and families. Eligible developers were nonprofit 
corporations and cooperatives, in which the distribution 
of net operating surplus for personal gain was 
prohibited. Thus these corporations have no incentive to 
generate profit and instead tend to minimize any 
increase in rent levels to an amount necessary to cover 
break-even costs.  
Project sponsors/developers were eligible to obtain 
insured mortgage loans covering 100 percent of capital 
cost. The resulting operating expenses, plus debt 
servicing expenses, were well above the level that could 
be covered by low affordable rents. Accordingly, an 
ongoing operating subsidy was provided (with a 35-year 
duration, matching the amortization period of the 
mortgage) During the 1978–1985 period, the form of the 
operating subsidy was finite, calculated as the difference 
between the amortizing mortgage payment calculated at 
the prevailing mortgage rate and the amount calculated 
at 2 percent. The nonprofit owner would then charge 
rents sufficient to cover an effective mortgage payment 
at 2 percent plus operating expenses.  
A minimum 15 percent of units were required to be 
provided at rents set at 25 percent of tenants gross 
income (this was raised to 30 percent in 1991), although 
in practice most nonprofit owners significantly exceed 
the minimum proportion of rent geared to income basis 
(RGI) units (averaging around 40 percent of all units). 
The remaining units were rented at a “low end of market 
(LEM) rent, typically about 95 percent of market rate, 
so that there was a mix of low and moderate income 
(avoiding issues of concentrated poverty and 
stigmatization of rental properties).  
The 1985–93 version of the program revised the subsidy 
mechanism and instead of the mortgage-reducing 
subsidy, it simply covered 100 percent of the operating 
deficit and encouraged a larger proportion of units 
targeted on an RGI 
Unlike the CRSP program this approach combined the 
objective of supply with the ancillary objective of 
affordability.  
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countries  planning  legislation  does  not  authorize  tenure  preference,  so  support  for  rental 
development is indirect under the guise of affordability inclusion. 
4.2  Developing a Private Rental Market: Policy Approaches  
As Figure 3 shows, past interventions have been channeled through taxation, direct or indirect 
subsidies,  and  facilitation  or  regulation  of  the  market  through  complementary  measures  or 
programs. These types of approach can be supply oriented, targeting investment in the rental 
sector, or demand based, focused on rental consumers via shelter allowances and mechanisms to 
improve affordability.  
  Indirect mechanisms, such as those favoring ownership, also affect the rental sector; for 
example, tax advantages provided to the ownership sector may undermine demand for rental. At 
the  same  time,  in  the  absence  of  any  significant  new  rental  supply  (the  case  in  most 
northern/western countries in the last two decades), policies, and mechanisms that favor and 
Box 4. Rental assistance (to separately address affordability issues) 
A.  Rent Supplements  
Rent supplements have been used in Canada as a contractual arrangement with landlords to 
allocate certain units to eligible low-income households. The contract specified the market rent 
and rate at which this rent can be annually increased (usually an inflation linked rent index). 
Households pay partial rent based on 30 percent of income, with the program then paying the 
difference between this 30 percent RGI payment and the market rent. These supplementary 
payments are made directly to the landlord.   
B.  Housing Allowances  
Unlike a rent supplement, a housing allowance does not involve directly contracting with a 
landlord. It leaves recipients to freely choose where they live and to select their own unit. It is 
possible to have minimal condition or size standards in order to ensure the program is not 
supporting poor quality housing. The subsidy payment similarly uses a percentage of income, 
such as 30 percent but adds a further formulaic element, a “percentage of gap” between the 30 
percent level and actual market rent.  
So if the market rent is $500 and 30 percent of income is $375, the gap is $125. The percentage 
of gap covers a specified percent of this gap such as 60 percent (so $75) or 75 percent ($93.75). 
The percent of rent in programs in British Colombia and Manitoba varies, starting at 90 percent 
for the lowest-income recipients declining linearly to 60 percent in Manitoba and 65 percent in 
British Colombia, while in Quebec the payment is only two-thirds of the affordability gap 
(Steele, 2006). This approach requires the recipient to pay part of the gap and thus induces an 
element of consumer control so that the recipient that is paying part of the cost has incentive to 
select a lower cost unit. The cost is also managed by imposing a maximum rent for eligible 
assistance.   
  24 
encourage  access  to  ownership  have  had  a  beneficial  effect  on  rental  markets  by  removing 
demand that without supply would cause rent inflation and exacerbate affordability concerns.  
It should be noted the research and the associated analytical framework developed by 
Lampert et al. (1998) focused on measures governments have used to promote and expand the 
private  rental  sector.  Thus  this  framework  speaks  only  to  the  task  of  establishing  and 
maintaining a private rental sector; it does not address the corollary matter of a social rental 
sector, nor the basis and rationale for creating a parallel social rental sector.  
Figure 3. Public Interventions that Affect the Private Rental Market 
Type  of 
interventions 
Supply Oriented  Demand Oriented 
Taxation  -  Property tax treatment 
-  Tax credit to investor 
-  Income  tax  provisions  on  rental 
investment income 
-  Mortgage interest deductibility from income 
tax (for homeowners) 
-  Tax exempt homeowners saving plans 
-  Treatment  of  capital  gains  on  principal 
residence 
-  Homeownership property tax grants  
-  Renter tax credit (to improve affordability) 
Subsidies  -  Supply  incentive  programs 
including grants and loans  
-  Renovation assistance 
-  Mortgage  subsidies,  grants  and 
loans to investors/developers 
-  Conversion programs (to rental) 
-  Land zoning and banking  
-  Shelter allowances 
-  Mortgage or other subsidies (for owners)  
Facilitation  -  Mortgage insurance  -  Tenant advocacy and counseling centers  
Regulation  -  Land development fees and charges  
-  Maintenance and occupancy bylaws  
-  Tenant  protection  legislation  (also 
demand impact)  
-  Rent  regulation  and  control  (also 
demand impact) 
-  Tenant  protection  legislation  (also  supply 
impact)  
-  Rent  regulation  and  control  (also  supply 
impact) 
In examining the existing context in each country to determine which, if any, of the 
prerequisite conditions exist, it is also useful to identify the components of the housing system 
that policy initiatives are intended to influence. In particular:  
•  What segment of consumers – the low-income segment only, low- to moderate-income or 
a broad spectrum across income bands?  
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•  Is the policy objective (based on an assessment of the housing problem(s) to stimulate 
only investment and promotion of rental options within the existing stock, or is there a 
need and policy desire to stimulate new construction of housing (i.e., a supply objective)? 
•  If  the  policy  objective  is  focused  primarily  of  encouraging  rental  investment  (and  is 
indifferent to new or existing stock) is the potential target small individual investors or 
larger scale corporate or institutional investment? And do such corporate and institutional 
investors exist?  
4.3  Some Policy Implications  
This brief review of experience in developed countries provides some insight into a number of 
key questions that underpin the development and expansion of a rental-housing sector, and how a 
rental  sector  might  be  expanded  in  LAC  countries.  In  developing  LAC  countries,  the 
development of the rental market is of critical importance, as the poor cannot always attain 
homeownership.  Developed  countries  have  centered  most  of  their  interventions  to  increase 
homeownership in the developing countries, but it is not clear as to whether this policy has had a 
positive impact in developing countries. The following are important questions to consider when 
developing policies to expand the rental sector in these countries. 
1.  To what extent is a rental sector important to a healthy housing system? 
Experience  across  a  range  of  countries  has  revealed  long-term  trends  that  promote  a  social 
housing sector and owner occupation in favor of renting. In almost all countries this has been 
followed by declining production of housing allocated for renting or general decline in rental 
tenure rates. The 2008 global financial crisis is attributed by many as a result of overzealous 
promotion of owner occupation and excess ease in obtaining credit to purchase. In addition to 
impacting international and national financial systems, this has had dire consequences for many 
owners, with some losing their home to mortgage default and others faced with negative equity 
that will burden them with a long-term liability. In a well functioning housing system, producers 
of  housing  should  not  have  an  overwhelming  preference  for  producing  homes  for  owner 
occupants in favor of homes for renters; similarly, consumers should be indifferent to tenure 
options.   
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A further benefit of an effective rental sector is that it creates choice and opportunities as 
a transitional stepping stone for younger households; it supports and enhances labor mobility and 
thereby productivity. Provided that appropriate management companies exist, rental ownership 
and operation can be an effective management structure for larger multiunit properties, which are 
more common in large urbanizing LAC cities. As such, the development of a rental sector is an 
important component in rebalancing national housing systems. A well-functioning rental sector, 
ideally with both private renting and social components, is critical to a sustainable and well-
functioning housing system. There does not appear to be any perfect ratio of owner occupation, 
private renting, and social renting (or other tenure alternatives)—as this is a function of cultural 
norms and preferences—, but some mix of each component seems essential. 
Public policy in developing countries should therefore not favor homeownership over the 
development of the rental market for low-income households. Governments should use balanced 
and complementary approaches. Also, they could use any instrument (i.e., tax incentives and/or 
subsidies) to respond efficiently and adequately to the housing needs, especially concerning the 
development of a sustainable rental market for low-income households. 
2.  What types of initiatives are necessary preconditions to successfully nurture the 
rental sector? 
Much of the experience of the OECD and northern countries, discussed in the previous section, 
reveals the consequences of the lack of or poorly designed policy and programs, as well as the 
inadvertent outcome of well-intentioned policy. Thus, they offer lessons and insights on what not 
to do rather than exemplary evidence of effective housing systems. To the extent that apartments 
are typically smaller and less expensive than individual attached dwellings, if the intent is to 
nurture a rental sector to address housing needs among lower-moderate income households, the 
planning system must both permit and encourage construction of apartment structures. These do 
not need to be large structures; rather smaller structures can be highly effective to enable the 
participation of smaller investors. 
In the province of Quebec, Canada for example, much of the housing stock in urban areas 
like Montreal is in the form of three- and fourplexes, with an owner occupant in one unit and the 
other units provided as rentals. These types of units are mainly purchased by small investors.  
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Most of these investors are moderate and low-income workers that choose this vehicle to save 
and  build  an  asset.  In  other  areas,  small  structures  of  4-20  units  are  also  quite  common, 
especially those built in the 1950s and 1960s. It should be noted that this form of rental supply is 
not an outcome of explicit intentional policy or programs. These are simply outcomes derived 
from motivated investor behavior that are responding to demand and, to some degree, driven by 
a cultural behavior in which households want to remain mobile.   = 
For larger structures it is necessary to attract the interest of corporate or institutional 
investors, so rates of return must be sufficient and competitive relative to alternate investments. 
Rents generated on lower-income targeted properties are typically insufficient to attract such 
investors; their involvement is more realistic at mid- to upper-market rent levels and in larger 
multiunit  structures.  This  also  requires  the  availability  or  nurturing  of  property  management 
firms with appropriate expertise to professionally manage these larger assets. It is likely to be a 
greater challenge to attract the necessary investment to produce large structures. The experiences 
in North America suggest that institutional owners seldom produce new properties; rather they 
seek out existing buildings with established and predictable cash flows, avoiding development 
risk.  Much  of  the  stock  that  such  investors  are  now  acquiring  was  built  under  the  stimulus 
programs of the 1970s and 1980s.  
As discussed above, either type of investor—small or large—requires access to financing 
(and  attendant  security  of  a  land  registration  system).  All  investors  will  be  discouraged  by 
regulatory systems that have the effect of suppressing potential rent levels and rates of return. A 
system that permits vacancy decontrol (rents readjust to true market) is preferable to stringent 
controls on levels of rents.  
3.  Does  it  matter  whether  the  rental  sector  is  driven  by  public  or  private 
investment and ownership of assets? 
If the main objective is supply, governments should be indifferent to public (community-social) 
versus private ownership of assets. The experience in OECD countries reflects both approaches. 
Many  western  European  countries  took  advantage  of  large-scale  public  investment  to  create 
substantial public or community sector rental sectors in immediate post war periods. This was  
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augmented in a few countries (notable Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden) with favorable loans 
to encourage private development.
5  
Both Canada and the United States utilized the private sector to expand rental supply in 
the 1960s and 1970s, providing a positive investment environment and range of incentives. This 
helped to expand the private rental sector to one-fourth of all housing. In exchange for low 
interest rate, financing was a form of property specific rent control, a constraint in place for 20 
years. All of the stock built under that specific program has now emerged from this constraint 
and  an  “expiring  use”  problem  has  emerged.  Rents  are  no  longer  restricted  and  owners  are 
gradually moving rents to market rates, well above affordable levels. If affordability is a parallel 
or primary objective, the public or community sector can be a valuable mechanism to avoid these 
types of expiring use issues and ensure long-term affordability (a legacy of public investment) 
All countries have used public supply (initially in the form of public housing), and all 
have experienced difficulties, such as excessive public bureaucracies, concentrations of poverty, 
and inability to manage rising expenditures. A number of countries have shifted from public 
housing to nonprofit and cooperative “social” housing. Smaller scale, income-mixed properties 
that are less bureaucratically managed have proven to be better vehicles. This new policy was 
intended  to  shift  the  responsibility  from  the  government  to  the  group,  insuring  a  better 
management  of  the  project,  such  as  people  in  cooperatives  that  own  collectively  and  are 
responsible for their unit or nonprofit local boards that are more in control of insuring quality of 
the  housing  stock.  Most  significantly,  the  nonprofit  status  preserves  long-term  affordability, 
avoiding such problems as the private sector use issue and the public housing ghettoization 
concern.  
Two studies in Canada (Ekos, 1997; Pomeroy, 2006) have examined the long-term cost 
effectiveness of private rental (with rent supplements) versus nonprofit housing. The analyses 
                                                 
5 That said, reviewers have suggested that the record of public ownership (particularly in LAC countries) is not 
generally positive. The public sector has not proven to be a good producer or operator of housing. The more 
successful cases in developed countries appear to be those engaging nonprofit, cooperative, or local municipal 
ownership and management. That is not to say that private operators necessarily generate better outcomes (in terms 
of quality and maintenance, security of occupancy, and affordability).   
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examined actual data for pairs of market and nonprofit properties constructed at the same year 
using  data  back  to  mid  1970s.  The  nonprofit  option  creates  supply  as  well  as  addressing 
affordability. To simplify the analysis and remove any bias of a specific program design, it was 
assumed in both cases that a rent supplement was used to address the affordability aspect. In the 
private  market  case,  the  rent  supplement  cost  is  based  on  the  difference  between  actual 
contracted  market  rent  and  30  percent  of  household  income.  In  the  nonprofit  option,  it  is 
calculated as the difference between a breakeven rent (including operating costs as well as debt 
service on 100 percent of construction costs). The analyses found that the long-term average rate 
of increase in breakeven rents in the nonprofit projects was roughly half the rate of increase of 
the market rents in the private properties. Thus assisting an identical household (same size and 
income) paying 30 percent of income rent with a rent supplement then covering the difference 
between this 30 percent and either the contracted market rent or nonprofit breakeven would 
become increasingly less expensive over time. These studies assumed new build at the outset for 
both  market  and  nonprofit  options.  In  today’s  market,  and  with  the  increasing  costs  of 
construction, if an existing rental property at average market rent were selected for placement of 
the debt supplement, it would be significantly less expensive than the breakeven rent on a newly 
constructed nonprofit property due to the higher development cost and associated debt servicing 
expense. With a wider initial gap the along run advantage of breakeven operation in the nonprofit 
would take longer to catch up, usually beyond 35 years. Thus while nonprofit models can be less 
costly than private market when both initially involve new construction, nonprofit provision with 
new construction is more cost effective than placing rent supplements on existing older rental 
that operate close to average market levels.   
A key challenge in concurrently supporting and promoting both private sector expansion 
and community (social) renting is avoiding the creation of unfair competition. For example, 
providing subsidy to the community sector and not to the private investors, while both provide 
accommodation to similar tenants and thus compete for tenants. This can, and has been, achieved 
by maintaining equal levels of support (access to low rate direct financing, or partially forgivable 
loans) to both the private and community sector. This is often described as a unitary rental 
system, a single set of production incentives often coupled with a separate affordability subsidy 
that does not distinguish private or social sector. Countries with separate and competing social  
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and private sectors are identified as dualist systems with differentiated levels of support and 
arguably  unfair  competition  between  the  sectors.  Promoting  an  integrated  rental  system  is 
preferable.   
4.  If a private rented sector is desirable, what barriers to investment have been 
evidenced to date in countries with an established rental sector? 
As already noted, the most critical deterrent to a sustainable private rented sector is an uncertain 
regulatory regime. This is often a more significant barrier than weak rates of return, although 
these too will be an important factor. Imbalance in the overall housing system, with preferential 
treatment given to the social rental sector or to the owner-occupied sector, will also discourage 
private rental investment.  
In  North  American  markets,  emphasis  on  homeownership  (especially  nontaxation  of 
capital gains, and in the United States, mortgage interest deductibility) makes the ownership 
sector  more  attractive.  Where  strata  title  (condominium)  systems  have  been  adopted  (most 
countries) to enable ownership of apartments or flats in multiunit structures, this in turn drives 
land values beyond those that allow economically feasible rental development.  
5.  What  type  of  environment  (combined  incentive,  regulatory  and  facilitative 
measures) can help create an interest in a rental sector?  
In an ideal world, it would not be necessary to establish a policy framework to encourage and 
promote  a  viable  rental  sector.  The  nature  forces  of  consumption  (demand)  would  generate 
supply. Investors seeing opportunity as rental providers would purchase property and provide 
this  at  competitive  rental  rates  to  consumers.  However,  past  policy  interventions  that  have 
favored  other  sectors  has  built  distortions  into  the  market  such  that  rental  housing  is  both 
unviable and unattractive to potential investors. So the primary policy response should be to 
examine  existing  competing  policies  and  remove  or  minimize  their  distorting  effects.  As 
suggested a balanced regulatory regime that concurrently provides security of occupancy for 
tenants,  but  allows  investors  a  fair  rate  of  return  (inflation  based  rent  index  and  vacancy 
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The second condition is an opportunity for investors to generate a reasonable rate of 
return. Typically because real cost of debt service tends to decline over time as incomes and thus 
rents inflate, rates of return become more favorable over the longer term. For this reason, many 
stimulus programs have tended to provide assistance over the initial years of operation (e.g., first 
5 to 10 years) to supplement otherwise low and unattractive rates of return. This includes interest 
free  or  forgivable  loans,  which  effectively  reduce  initial  investor  equity,  required  and  thus 
improve return on equity. From a post tax perspective, permitting deductibility of both cash 
losses and artificial loss via depreciation allowances (as used successfully in Australia and New 
Zealand (Lampert et. al., 1998) helps to overcome weak rates of return, both during initial years 
and beyond. Potential return on equity is also impacted by ability to access financing (leverage) 
and thus minimize direct equity investment; thus a well-functioning housing finance system is 
important. 
6.  Establishing and nurturing a community-based rental sector. 
Many LAC countries continue to experience low levels of new housing production, and thus 
have a supply constraint, which impacts overall housing affordability. While mechanisms to 
stimulate private investment and production are possible, another approach is to follow the early 
postwar emphasis in many western countries of direct state support for housing supply (although 
this was a broad scale approach, not solely focused on low-income affordable supply).  
In countries where prerequisite conditions to enable or expand private rental are weak, 
this public/social model may yield faster results. This would entail creating a publicly-owned 
development  corporation  to  assemble  and  expand  capacity  in  development  and  construction. 
Once constructed assets can either be sold to private sector investors or to community nonprofits 
to operate these properties.  
A  community-based  sector  can  be  created  in  parallel  with  encouragement  of  private 
sector expansion, provided it does not receive preferential treatment and put the private sector at 
a disadvantage. The U.S. model under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (1986–present) is a 
good example of an integrated system allowing both private and nonprofit sponsors to compete 
for credit allocations and develop assets.   
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While the postwar approach in many countries emphasized direct public ownership and 
created large public housing bureaucracies, in some countries this took the form of community-
based  nonprofit  and  cooperative  corporations  or  hybrid  organizations,  publicly  owned  but 
operating at arms length including the municipal housing corporations in Denmark, Netherlands, 
and Sweden (and now, through stock transfer, the housing associations that dominate in the UK 
and are being considered in Australia). 
Canada also undertook a public housing model initially but refocused its approach to 
affordable housing provision in the early 1970s to help create a community housing sector. As a 
new  model,  it  was  necessary  to  build  capacity  and  for  the  national  government  to  provide 
funding  to  create  technical  assistance  “resource  groups”  who  could  take  on  development 
activities  for  an  array  of  community  based  nonprofits,  including  faith  organizations,  ethnic 
groups,  and  service  clubs.  So  each  housing  provider  did  not  need  to  have  specific  skills  in 
housing development, but was required to retain or develop a property management capacity 
internally.  
While identified generically here, there are different variants of nonprofit community 
housing  providers.  These  can  include  NGOs,  such  as  nonprofit  corporations  with  a  specific 
mission to provide and operate affordable housing; cooperative housing associations, which have 
a similar mission by all residents are members and internally create a board for self governance; 
and quasi municipal agencies, with board and governance structures related to local municipal 
councils but also augmented with outside board members. Regardless of type, in Canada funding 
was provided to produce new housing (and also permitted acquisition and rehabilitation, where 
feasible), initially in the form of low-rate financing. As land and development costs inflated and 
breakeven rents moved above desired affordable rent levels, separate rent supplements were 
introduced to reduce rents for low-income tenants (with rent set initially at 25 percent of gross 
income).  Subsequently,  social  housing  assistance  was  revised  to  combine  supply  and 
affordability assistance in a single ongoing operating subsidy together with publicly secured 
mortgage  financing  at  100  percent  of  cost  (using  insured  lending  provisions  of  the  national 
housing agency, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation). The ongoing subsidy then helped 
cover related debt servicing expenses while also ensuring affordable rents affordable to low-
income tenants.   
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Over the subsequent 30 years, Canada’s social housing stock expanded to reach 6 percent 
of total stock with a network of cooperative and nonprofit housing providers owning the assets, 
providing ongoing management services, and ensuring preservation of long-term affordability 
via  their  nonprofit  status.  Their  mission—to  provide  affordable  housing—was  enabled  by 
government-funded subsidy programs. One consequence of this model in Canada is that while 
accounting  for  6  percent  of  total  stock,  the  structure  of  the  community-based  sector  is 
characterized by a high level of fragmentation with many single project (multiunit) providers. 
Few  have  over  500  units,  and  there  is  insufficient  scale  to  generate  economies  of  scale  in 
operations  or  to  build  expertise  and  capacity.  The  key  lesson  here  is  that  community-based 
provision can be an effective vehicle, especially for preserving ongoing affordability. However, 
it is critical to create community-based operators at scale (e.g., ultimately operating 500–3,000 
units). 
Nurturing and sustaining a sound community rental sector also requires the availability of 
volunteers to sit on boards and provide appropriate level of governance. This too has emerged as 
an  issue  over  the  longer  term.  Many  were  happy  to  become  involved  during  planning  and 
construction, motivated by the challenge and excitement of building an asset. However, lack of 
recruitment and board renewal and a perceived lower interest level in asset management versus 
construction has resulted in challenges in retaining and renewing boards, and, in some cases poor 
governance  (at  least  in  small  single  project  providers).  The  important  lesson  is  to  focus  on 
ongoing management and governance with appropriate capacity building support.  
A  partnership  with  the  community  could  play  a  vital  role  for  the  success  of  the 
development  of  rental  markets  in  developing  countries.  Studies  of  Multilateral  Development 
Banks (MDBs) have shown that efforts to stimulate community driven development have grown 
rapidly  and  that  involvement  of  community-based  organizations  and  NGOs can  yield  strong 
positive effects on MDB-supported projects (Buckley and Clerical, 2004). The government’s 
role  in  bolstering  rental  markets  would  therefore  be  to  help  build  partnerships  among  all 
concerned  public  agencies,  private  sector,  NGO  representatives,  and  community-based 
organizations, and to give each cooperative or nonprofit organization an opportunity to create 
and apply their own housing solutions in conjunction with their partners. This would build long- 
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term capacity in the development of a community rental market for low-income households 
(Buckley and Kalarickal, 2004). 
The UK has followed a different model, especially in transferring social housing stock 
from local authorities (public housing) to housing associations. These tend to be larger, generally 
with  portfolios  of  1,000-5,000  dwellings  and  staff  levels  are  sufficient  to  build  specialized 
expertise. Recently, the UK government took this one step further and restricted approval for 
new build to a few larger designated “development partners” – Housing associations with the 
necessary skill and expertise to effective management procurement of new construction.  
A critical distinction between a community-based rental sector and private sector is that 
most community-based entities have limited assets and capital. Thus they are highly dependent 
on  a  subsidy  regime  and  impose  ongoing  and  often  rising  expenditures  on  government;  the 
private sector tends to utilize high levels of financial leverage in combination with direct equity 
investment. This requires rents at a sufficient level to service debt and to yield a return on 
invested equity, but usually require less subsidy assistance. Of course, underlying this difference 
is the fact that public and social housing seek to serve the lowest-income population, and thus 
require much deeper subsidy assistance than average market renters.  
The municipal housing companies established in postwar Western Europe were initially 
publically funded, but have amassed a sufficient pool of assets, most with retired debt, such that 
they can now lever the rental cash flows for expansion. This takes a full generation of investment 
before assets provide this opportunity. These corporations, while nonprofit in nature, are also a 
source of general supply with a good mix of market rate tenants, thus improving their financial 
viability. In the UK, the stacking of a shelter allowance (housing benefit) as a separate form of 
revenue  subsidy  has  enabled  housing  associations  to  similarly  leverage  financing  for 
refurbishment and expansion.  
7.  Consolidation: some proposed options for consideration in LAC countries.  
Prior to prescribing particular approaches in any LAC country, it will be important to review and 
analyze the existing context in each. This should include the following: 
•  A review of the land market;   
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•  State of the current supply issue and housing industry capacity;  
•  Existence and state of social security and income assistance (potentially including 
housing allowances or conditional income assistance linked to housing expenditure)  
•  Existing  of  a  community  nonprofit  sector  capable  of  developing  and  managing 
housing assets and possibly related subsidies. 
•  Availability and capacity for housing finance (via private lending institutions or via 
direct government loans);  
•  The extent to which small scale investors (distinct from informal family renting) are 
already present and active;  
•  The presence and potential for larger corporate or institutional investors to take an 
active role in the rental market; and 
•  The existing regulatory regime (degree to which it balances consumer protection and 
security of occupancy with rent setting policies and constraints).  
In the absence of detailed country level assessments, it is expected that smaller scale 
investors in the informal rental market and the community nonprofit rental sector may present 
the  least  difficult  approach  and  more  fertile  areas  for  initial  attention.  Encouragement  and 
support  for  larger  scale  corporate  or  institutional  investment  is  likely  a  more  challenging 
proposition requiring more mature rental systems and institutional frameworks (both the UK and 
Australia have in the past implemented initiatives to attract institutional investment as a way to 
grow the rental sector, and both have met with limited levels of interest or investment—and 
coincidentally both have rental systems currently dominated by small scale investors). 
8.  Clearly defining the nature of the housing issue 
It is important to distinguish supply problems and policies from affordability issues (even when 
they coexist). The latter reflect weak capacity of households to pay rent (a function of low 
incomes) and are irreconcilable with the economics of production on a for profit investment basis 
(rental revenues are unavailable to sustain debt servicing costs). If a particular country has both a 
supply shortage and affordability issues, it is more fruitful to segregate these issues and promote  
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supply  as  a  separate  objective  targeting  working  class  and  middle  income  consumers  with 
capacity to pay reasonable (and viable) rents.  
Affordability issues fundamentally reflect inadequate income and are better addressed via 
conditional income assistance, such as a housing allowance. Countries with large social or quasi-
social housing sectors (e.g., Sweden) often have parallel housing allowances (Germany, Sweden, 
UK) that effectively address affordability while properties operate at market rents (supported by 
the  housing  allowance).  This  generates  the  necessary  cash  flows  to  make  production  and 
operations viable. However, in most LAC countries such universal shelter allowance programs 
are unlikely to exist, and would be expensive to implement, so it is more likely that direct 
investment  in  new  supply  initiatives  will  be  more  practical.  If  the  priority  issue  is  lack  of 
sufficient new supply, as it more often is in LAC developing countries, appropriate policies are 
those that encourage production. Here the private development sector (if one exists) is the ideal 
target for policies and capacity building initiatives. Fully developing such a policy framework is 
outside the scope of this paper, but the private development sector will build if there is a firm 
market for their product (at a price that covers cost and profit). Thus rental policy needs to create 
an investment environment to acquire properties once constructed, essentially an outlet for the 
product of builder/developers.  
While the community nonprofit sector has played an active role in developing affordable 
housing in some countries—notably France, Netherlands, and the UK and, at a smaller scale, 
Canada—,  the  true  benefit  of  the  community  nonprofit  sector  (potentially  including 
cooperatives) is in owning and managing assets. Because they do not have a profit motive, they 
can help to preserve affordability over the long run. It is possible to “purchase” development 
expertise in the private market, which in turn helps to expand capacity in the production part of 
the housing system. Rather than nurture the community sector as developers, it may be more 
effective to focus their efforts and build their capacity in asset and property management (and 
possibly, if addressing the needs of the low-income population, rental subsidy administration). 
Moreover, to the extent that large-scale property management expertise is lacking, building this 
expertise in the community nonprofit/coop sector may be useful.  
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The other possibility is that small investors will purchase newly produced housing not for 
occupancy themselves but as an investment as a rental asset. In the many countries where small-
scale investors are active, their involvement tends to focus much more on acquiring existing 
assets. Most lack the expertise and inclination to take on new development, so an alternative 
vehicle is needed to generate production (possible a public development corporation, or where in 
place, private sector development).  
If the land registration, financing and regulatory frameworks are not in place or not fully 
implemented, it may be more difficult to attract private investment, even at small scale (other 
than  on  an  informal  basis).  In  such  circumstances,  promoting  and  supporting  the  growth  of 
community housing associations and cooperatives as the legal entities to own and manage assets 
may be a more expedient approach, as regulatory matters can be more tailored and included in 
funding and operating contracts.  
5  Conclusions and Possible Directions 
The appropriate course of action will depend on the actual context in any country and can only 
effectively  be  developed  following  an  assessment  of  the  various  factors  noted  in  Section  4 
herein. 
5.1   Suggestions for Short-Term Strategy Development 
Following an assessment of country context, in the short-term policy initiatives should focus on 
both the informal small-scale investor and the social-community nonprofit sector:  
•  The  small  private  investors  can  be  a  primary  mechanism  to  provide  rental 
accommodation, mainly via investment in the existing housing stock, as experience in 
developed  countries  suggests  that  such  investors  do  not  typically  take  on  the  more 
complicated  (and  risky)  task  of  building  the  dwelling.  This  can  be  encouraged  by 
preferential tax treatment of rental income and also provides a way for middle-income 
families to build assets for retirement income. 
•  The social-community nonprofit sector can play an important parallel role in helping to 
expand rental options, and as a way to sustain and preserve affordability of this stock in 
the long term.   
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In countries where an investor class is small or nonexistent, it may be more expeditious to 
create and build capacity in the community sector. This might include both traditional nonprofit 
corporations,  ideally  with  a  mixed  housing  and  community  development  social  enterprise 
mandate, as well as self-build and managing cooperatives. The advantage of cooperatives is that 
ongoing  management  capacity  can  be  built  internally  through  community  based  technical 
assistance  agencies.  These  technical  assistance  groups  can  also  undertake  the  more  skilled 
development process on behalf of coops and nonprofit owners. 
For both small private investors and community sector investment, access to financing 
(secured by anticipated rental revenues) is a critical prerequisite. Lending policies will need to be 
reviewed  and  possibly  developed  to  ensure  such  access.  A  set  of  incentive  mechanisms  is 
required to encourage and promote small-scale investment. In many developed countries this has 
come through the tax preference conveyed to rental investment income (with Australia, New 
Zealand and, pre-1973, Canada being notable examples). This includes ability to deduct losses 
from rental investment against other sources of income, as well as exempting all or part of the 
capital gain from income tax. Investment can also be motivated via mechanisms like interest free 
loans  that  reduce  the  investors  out  of  pocket  equity  requirements  (effectively  lowering  the 
investment threshold). 
Compared  to  large  corporate  investors,  small-scale  investors  generally  seem  less 
cognizant  of  the  regulatory  regime.  Many  have  a  long-term  investment  perspective  and  are 
“patient  investors.”  However,  the  regulatory  regime  does  impact  willingness  to  invest  or 
incentives to disinvest (Pomeroy, 1998). It is critical to review and, where appropriate, reform 
regulatory regimes to ensure a balance regime, and then minimize ongoing “tinkering” so that 
the effects of the regulatory regime can be capitalized into the market.  
5.2  Recommendations for Medium-Longer Term Development  
The  other  potential  investor  segment  is  the  corporate  and  institutional  investor.  The  former 
played  a  significant  role  in  the  North  American  expansion  of  rental  stock  through  new 
construction  during  the  1960s  and  1970s.  The  growth  largely  preceded  the  widespread 
acceptance of condominiums tenure (condominium legislation was introduced in the 1969–1971 
period in Canadian provinces), such that multiunit apartment construction through the 1970s and  
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early  1980s  continued  to  be  predominantly  for  rental.  This  sector  emerged  as  governments 
created incentive mechanisms including below market and interest free loans and in some cases 
grants  and  traditional  builders  transformed  their  business  from  subdivisions  and  building 
detached  homes  for  sale  to  constructing  multiunit  apartment  structures.  Certain  corporations 
developed expertise in rental housing and property management and created large portfolios of 
income  producing  properties.  Advantageous  tax  treatment  of  rental  property  income  also 
provided  additional  incentives.  As  noted  previously,  many  such  producers  and  owners  have 
subsequently refocused their efforts on producing apartments for sale (condominiums), and have 
sold their rental portfolios to institutional investors and real estate trusts (REITs), which are 
specialized tax exempt investments that effectively acquire and manage larger portfolios and 
distribute all net income to investors, where the investment is taxed as investment income.  
To the extent that LAC countries wish to expand the rental sector at scale, such large-
scale  corporate  actors  can  be  valuable  vehicles,  as  they  are  sufficiently  large  to  have  the 
specialized skills and capacity to develop property and multiunit structures, as well as undertake 
ongoing  asset  management.  Conversely,  small-scale  investors,  while  effective  in  operating 
investments of detached homes or small apartment buildings, lack the specialized expertise and 
capacity to develop and manage larger-scale undertakings.  
To stimulate participation of such large-scale investors, corporate tax structures will be 
required (in this case for principle business corporations engaged in real estate development and 
management). Again, access to financing will be important, although such corporations have 
broader options in addition to property specific mortgage finance. They can issue corporate debt 
and leverage their corporate balance sheet.  
In  the  event  that  potential  rates  of  return  are  insufficient  to  make  rental  investment 
attractive  (even  after  favorable  tax  measures),  additional  incentives  may  be  required.  If  the 
primary objective is to create rental supply, it may not be imperative to attach targeting or tenant 
eligibility conditions to these financial incentives. However, as noted previously, if the primary 
objective is long-term affordability, it may be more feasible to invest in nonprofit corporations, 
where the long-term affordability objective is not in conflict with profitability.   
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